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Abstract
We propose a dynastic model in which individuals are born in an educated or
uneducated environment that they inherit from their parents. We study the role of
social networks on the correlation in the parent-child educational status independent
of any parent-child interaction. We show that the network reduces the intergenerational
correlation, promotes social mobility and increases the average education level in the
population. We also show that a planner that encourages social mobility also reduces
social welfare, hence facing a trade off between these two objectives. When individuals
choose the optimal level of social mobility, those born in an uneducated environment
always want to leave their environment while the reverse occurs for individuals born
in an educated environment.
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1 Introduction
Explaining the educational outcomes of children is one of the most challenging questions
faced by economists. Most studies have found that school quality (e.g., Card and Krueger,
1992, 1996) and family background (e.g., Ermisch and Francesconi, 2001, Sacerdote, 2002,
Plug and Vijverberg, 2003) have a significant and positive impact on the level of education
of children. Parents obviously influence their children’s school performance by transmitting
their genes to the children, but they also influence them directly, via, for example, their
parenting practices and the type of schools to which they send their children (Björklund
et al., 2006; Björklund and Salvanes, 2011). Neighborhood and peer effects have also an
important impact on educational outcomes of children (Sacerdote, 2001; Durlauf, 2004;
Ioannides and Topa, 2010; Sacerdote 2010; Patacchini and Zenou, 2011).
We study the intergenerational relationship between parents’ and offspring’s long-run
educational outcomes.1 In every society, people’s educational achievement is positively cor-
related with their parents’ education or with other indicators of their parents’ socio-economic
status (Björklund and Salvanes, 2011). In the present paper, we illustrate how this correla-
tion can result from peer effects, abstracting from any direct parental influence.
To be more precise, we develop a dynastic model where, at each period of time, with some
probability, a person (the parent or the father) dies and is replaced by a new born (the child
or the son). The son thereby never interacts with his father. Instead, individuals are born in
an environment (local community) that they inherit from their parents. This environment
is modelled as a dyad in which the newborn interacts with a partner, called his strong tie.
This strong tie is precisely the individual who interacted in the father’s dyad before he died.
Using the language of the cultural transmission literature (Bisin and Verdier, 2000, 2001),
in our model, there is no vertical transmission (i.e. socialization inside the family) but only
horizontal transmission (i.e. socialization outside the family).
We want to show that, even if a parent and his child never live together at the same
time (and thus never interact with each other), there is still a significant correlation between
the educational achievement of the father and the son because of peer effects, i.e. the son
1See Björklund and Jäntti (2009), Black and Devereux (2011) and Björklund and Salvanes (2011) for
recent reviews of intergenerational transmission of income and education.
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is exposed to the same (educational) environment as his father. In our model, individuals
meet both weak and strong ties, where weak ties are modelled as members of other dyads.
Individuals choose their optimal educational efforts but we assume that interacting with
an uneducated individual (strong or weak tie) lowers the returns from effort. This cost
captures the idea of negative peer effects, i.e. the fact that uneducated role models can
distract individuals from educating themselves by, for example, proposing activities that are
not related to education (watching TV, going to the movies, etc.). On the contrary, there is
no cost of interacting with educated peers.
In a benchmark model, we first show that, indeed, even though the parent and his child
never live together at the same time, there is a positive correlation between their educational
status because there is a substantial overlap in the surroundings that have influenced their
education decisions. This correlation is shown to be quadratic in the cost of inheriting of
an uneducated local community. Indeed, this cost is the only ingredient of the model which
differentiates individuals born in favorable environments from those born in unfavorable ones.
The quadratic form of this correlation comes from the fact that relations between parents
and children, rather than being direct, have to transit by the community.
We then build on this benchmark model to introduce the possibility for individuals to
interact with peers outside of their local community, called weak ties. Whether the fraction
of time spent with weak ties is exogenously fixed by a social planner, or is endogenously
chosen by the individuals, the intergenerational correlation is significantly reduced, thereby
promoting social mobility and increasing the average education level in the population. The
network, defined here as the interactions with both types of ties, is thus shown to have a great
importance, in terms of public policies aiming at reducing the social inertia communities are
facing.
When the socializing decisions are exogenously chosen by the social planner, we show that
if the planner’s aim is to reduce the correlation in education status between generations (or
equivalently, to promote social mobility), he will choose to mix individuals by encouraging
them to interact with weak ties. By doing so, the social planner will also increase the average
level of education in the population. However, we also show that this policy decreases social
welfare. This is because the individuals born in a favorable environment are penalized by
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such a policy while those born in an unfavorable environment are better off. The net effect
turns out to be negative as the loss of the former are not totally compensated by the gains
of the latter. This illustrates a common trade-off faced by a social planner between equity
(i.e. decreasing intergenerational correlation) and efficiency.
When the socializing decisions are endogenously chosen by the individuals, those with
uneducated strong ties always want to meet weak ties while the reverse occurs for individuals
with educated strong ties. This is simply because the former will, in the worse case, meet
another uneducated person and, at best, meet someone educated, and the reverse will happen
for the latter. We show that when individuals can escape their inherited environment,
intergenerational correlation decreases while the average education level in the population
increases.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. In the next section, we relate our model to the
relevant theoretical literatures. Section 3 exposes the model with no networks while Section
4 focuses on exogenous networks, i.e. exogenously fixed levels of social mixing. In Section
5, the network is endogenous since individuals choose how much time they spend with weak
and strong ties. Finally, Section 6 concludes. All proofs of propositions, lemmas and remarks
can be found in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
Our model is related to different literatures. First, it is related to the literature on peer ef-
fects in education. De Bartolome (1990) and Benabou (1993) are the standard references for
peer and neighborhood effects in education. In this multi-community approach, individuals
can acquire high or low skills or be unemployed. The costs of acquiring skills are decreasing
in the proportion of the community that is highly skilled but this decrease is larger for those
acquiring high skills. This leads to sorting although ex ante all individuals are identical.
There are other models of sorting (see Fernández, 2003, for a survey) but they are quite
different from our approach since they are static and focus on the role of peer effects in sort-
ing. While there is an extensive empirical literature on the intergenerational transmission of
income and education that focuses on the correlation of parental and children’s permanent
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income or education (Björklund and Jäntti, 2009; Black and Devereux, 2011; Björklund and
Salvanes, 2011), there are very few theoretical models studying this issue. Ioannides (2002,
2003) analyses the intergenerational transmission of human capital2 by explicitly developing
a dynamic model of human capital formation with a neighborhood selection. The idea here
is to study the impact of parental education and the distribution of educational attainment
within a relevant neighborhood on child educational attainment. From a theoretical view-
point, Ioannides obtains a complete characterization of the properties of the intertemporal
evolution of human capital. From an empirical viewpoint, he finds that there are strong
neighboring effects in the transmission of human capital and that parents’ education and
neighbors’ education have non linear effects that are consistent with the theory. Using a cul-
tural transmission model à la Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001), Patacchini and Zenou (2011)
analyze the intergenerational transmission of education focusing on the interplay between
family and neighborhood effects. They develop a theoretical model suggesting that both
neighborhood quality and parental effort are of importance for the education attained by
children. Their model proposes a mechanism explaining why and how they are of impor-
tance, distinguishing between high- and low-educated parents. Empirically, they find that
the better is the quality of the neighborhood, the higher is the parents’ involvement in their
children’s education. Finally, Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2009) study the intergenera-
tional transmission of education in an overlapping generations model where an individual
sees higher returns to adopting a behavior as many neighbors adopt the behavior (strategic
complements in actions). They find that the paret-child correlation can exist without direct
parental effect. Our paper is however quite different to these approaches since we explic-
itly model the social network each individual is embedded in and analyze how it affects the
transmission of education.
Second, our paper is also related to the social network literature. There is a growing in-
terest in theoretical models of peer effects and social networks (see e.g. Akerlof, 1997; Glaeser
et al., 1996; Ballester et al., 2006; Calvó-Armengol et al., 2009; Goyal, 2007; Jackson, 2008;
2See also Borjas (1992) who shows that the average human capital level of the ethnic group in the parents’
generation plays a crucial role in intergenerational mobility, and slows down the convergence in the average
skills of ethnic groups across generations.
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Ioannides, 2012). There is, however, nearly no theoretical model that looks at the impact
of social networks on education and, in particular, on the intergenerational transmission of
education. In the present paper, we model the network as the interaction between strong
and weak ties. In his seminal contributions, Granovetter (1973, 1974, 1983) defines weak ties
in terms of lack of overlap in personal networks between any two agents, i.e. weak ties refer
to a network of acquaintances who are less likely to be socially involved with one another.
Formally, two agents A and B have a weak tie if there is little or no overlap between their
respective personal networks. Vice versa, the tie is strong if most of A’s contacts also appear
in B’s network. In this context, Granovetter (1973, 1974, 1983) develops the idea that weak
ties are superior to strong ties for providing support in getting a job. Indeed, in a close
network where everyone knows each other, information is shared and so potential sources
of information are quickly shaken down so that the network quickly becomes redundant in
terms of access to new information. In contrast Granovetter stresses the strength of weak
ties involving a secondary ring of acquaintances who have contacts with networks outside
ego’s network and therefore offer new sources of information on job opportunities.3 In our
model, we stress the role of strong ties as an important mean for the transmission of educa-
tion. In other words, even though there is no direct influence from the parents, their indirect
influence through the inheritance of strong ties affects positively the correlation between the
parent and the child.
3 The benchmark model without social networks
3.1 Model
There are n individuals in the economy4. We assume that individuals belong to mutually
exclusive two-person groups, referred to as dyads. We say that two individuals belonging
to the same dyad hold a strong tie to each other. We assume that dyad members do not
3For surveys on this issue, see Ioannides and Loury (2004) and Topa (2011). For early models on weak
and strong ties, see Montgomery (1994) and Calvó-Armengol et al. (2007).
4We assume throughout that n is large, and all the propositions in the paper should be understood as
limiting propositions
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change over time unless one of them dies. A strong tie is created once and for ever and can
never be broken. Thus, we can think of strong ties as links between members of the same
family, or between very close friends. In this section and only here, we assume that different
dyads do not interact.
We consider a dynamic model, where, at each period, each individual in the dyad can
die with probability 1/n. When a person dies, he is automatically replaced by a new born
who is his son. The son is then matched with the individual who was previously in the same
dyad (strong tie) as his father. As stated in the introduction, this is the way we capture the
interaction between a father and a son. The only aspect that the son inherits from his father
is his father’s social environment or local community, here the father’s strong tie. There is
no other interaction between the father and the son. In particular, the father and the son
never live at the same time. This is because we want to aalyze the effect of the environment
(peer effects) on the child’s education outcomes, independent of any parent-child interaction.
Individuals can be of two types: j = 0 (non-educated) or j = 1 (educated). We now
describe how individuals determine their type. Each individual i is born with a λi (her
ability to learn education), which is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. The new
born knows the type of his partner and his own λi and he must decide his optimal education
effort level, given his ability λi and the type j of his strong tie. Observe that the education
decision is only made once and for all, at the birth of the individual. This implies that no
one can change his type during his lifetime.
The utility of individual i (of type λi) who meets individual j and exerts effort eij is
given by:
Ui0 (λi) = λiei0 − 1
2
e2i0 − α ei0
if he meets an uneducated person (j = 0), and
Ui1 (λi) = λiei1 − 1
2
e2i1
if he meets an educated person (j = 1). In this formulation, higher ability individuals obtain
higher benefits from education, i.e. λieij is increasing in λi. The cost of effort is increasing
and convex in effort and is equal to 1
2
e2ij. We assume that there is an extra cost of exerting
effort in education, α ei0 with α ≥ 0, when meeting someone who is not educated. This
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cost captures the idea of negative peer effects, i.e. the fact that uneducated role models
can distract individuals from educating themselves by, for example, proposing activities that
are not related to education (watching TV, going to the movies, etc.). There is plenty of
evidence of positive and negative peer effects in education (see, in particular, Sacerdote,
2001; Ioannides, 2003; Goux and Maurin, 2007; Calvó-Armengol et al., 2009; Patacchini and
Zenou, 2011). First-order conditions yield:
ei0 = max{0, λi − α} (1)
ei1 = λi (2)
We assume that when someone is not educated, he obtains an exogenous utility level equal to
U > 0 (his outside option, which could be, for example, the minimum wage). We would like
now to calculate the threshold value of λ, denoted by λ˜0 (resp. λ˜1) above which an individual
i who has an uneducated (resp. educated) strong tie will get educated. An individual with an
uneducated strong tie will be indifferent between education and non-education if and only
if:
Ui0
(
λ˜0
)
= U
while, for an individual with an educated strong tie, we have:
Ui1
(
λ˜1
)
= U
Solving these equations lead to:
λ˜0 =
√
2U + α (3)
λ˜1 =
√
2U (4)
so we assume (to have interior solutions)
0 <
√
2U <
√
2U + α < 1 (5)
In equilibrium, we obtain the following utilities:
U∗i0 (λi) = max
{
U,
(λi − α)2
2
}
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U∗i1 (λi) = max
{
U,
λ2i
2
}
Let us now calculate the probability p0 (resp. p1) that an individual with an uneducated
(resp. educated) strong tie will get educated. We easily obtain:
p0 = 1− λ˜0 = 1−
√
2U − α (6)
p1 = 1− λ˜1 = 1−
√
2U (7)
The following figure summarizes the probability of getting educated for all individuals.
1
~λ
Never educated
0
~λ
Always educatedEducated only when 
meeting educated individuals
0 1
p0
p1
Figure 1: The different probabilities of being educated
3.2 Steady-state equilibrium
So far, we have described what happens within a period. Let us now explain the dynamics of
the model and determine the steady-state equilibrium. As stated above, there is a random
overlapping generation model. Each generation of a given dynasty (or family) consists of
one individual. At the beginning of each period, one dynasty is randomly chosen and its
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member replaced by a new individual. This happens with equal probability across dynasties.
We refer to the new individual as the child and to the old individual as the parent.
In equilibrium, the share η1 of educated individuals is given by
η1 = 1− λ˜0 + (λ˜0 − λ˜1)η1 = p0 + (p1 − p0)η1
Indeed, the fraction of educated individuals are either those who have an ability between λ˜0
and 1 since they get educated whatever the status of their partner (see Figure 1) or those
who have an ability between λ˜1 and λ˜0 and who are matched with an educated partner (this
happens with probability η1). Rearranging this expression, we obtain:
η1 =
p0
1 + p0 − p1
Using (6) and (7), we obtain:
η1 =
1−
√
2U − α
1− α (8)
Of course, when
√
2U = 0 (i.e. there is no outside option) then everyone will prefer
getting educated, while if
√
2U = 1− α (i.e. U = (1−α)2
2
which is the highest possible payoff
when getting educated) then no one will get educated.
3.3 The correlation in education between parents and children
We would now like to calculate the intergenerational correlation in education between parents
and children. Though they do not interact with each other, there is a correlation which goes
through the social network (i.e. strong tie) the parent “transmits” to his child. Let X
refer to the education status of the parent and Y to the education status of the child. The
intergenerational correlation is given by:
Cor(X, Y ) =
Cov(X, Y )√
V ar(X)
√
V ar(Y )
where Cov(X,Y ) is the covariance between the educational status of the parent and the
child while V ar(X) and V ar(Y ) are the variances of the statuses of the parent and the
child. We have:
Cov(X, Y )
dyad
= E [(X = 1)(Y = 1)]− [E(X = 1)] [E(Y = 1)] = η11 − η21
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V ar(X)
dyad
= E [X = 1]− [E(X = 1)]2 = η1 − η21
where η1 is the marginal probability that an individual chooses state 1, i.e. the probability
of being educated in steady state (it is given by (8)), and η11, the joint probability that an
individual is in state 1 and his father was in state 1.
Individuals can be in either of two different states: educated (state 1) and uneducated
(state 0). Dyads, which consist of paired individuals, are, in steady state, in one of three
different states:
(i) both members are educated (11);
(ii) one member is educated and the other is not (01) or (10);
(iii) both members are uneducated (00).
The steady state distribution of dyads is given by µ = {µ00, µ10, µ01, µ11}, where µij
stands for the fraction of dyads in state (ij).5 Obviously, by symmetry, µ10 = µ01.
Proposition 1 Assume (5). When dyads do not interact with each other, the parent-child
correlation is equal to:6
Cordyad = α
2 (9)
This is an interesting result because it shows that the correlation between a father’s and
a son’s statuses is positive, even though they never interact with each other. The intuition
is simple: when the father is educated, his strong tie is likely to be educated (because the
father has influenced him) and therefore the son will benefit from a favorable environment
(i.e. an educated strong tie) and, as a result, his chances to be educated are higher.
In our setting, the correlation (9) increases with α, the cost of interacting with an uned-
ucated strong tie. Indeed, the difference in individual efforts (ei1 − ei0) between meeting an
educated and an uneducated strong tie is equal to α. If this difference is small, it is almost
the same to be matched with an educated or a non-educated partner and newborns decide
5Alternatively, µij can be interpreted as the fraction of time a typical dyad spends in state (ij)
6More generally, if λ is distributed between λ and λ, then the correlation is given by
(
α
λ−λ
)2
.
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whether to educate or not independently of the status of their strong tie. If this difference
is large, individuals’ decisions strongly depend on the status of their partner.
The quadratic form of the correlation is due to the pattern of influences between parents
and children, as they transit through the community. This “two-step” mechanism explains
the square.
We notice that α can also be written as p1 − p0. Indeed, p1 is the probability of acting
in the same way as an educated dyad partner while p0 is the probability of choosing the
opposite of an uneducated dyad partner. For instance, if p1 = 1 and p0 = 0, which means
that individuals always act according to their strong tie, then the correlation between the
education status of parents and children is perfect, i.e. Cordyad = 1. If p1 = p0, which means
that individuals act as frequently the same way and the opposite way as their strong tie,
then there is no correlation at all and Cordyad = 0. Finally, if p0 = 1 and p1 = 0, which
means that individuals always act exactly in the opposite way as their strong ties, then the
correlation is also perfect, i.e. Cordyad = 1.
This benchmark case illustrates in a very simple model how positive correlation can
appear as a result of indirect transmission of behavior through peers, as was pointed out
by Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2009). However, individuals usually interact with people
outside of their local community and this might have a significant impact on correlation. We
explore this in the next section by introducing weak ties.
4 Social networks and exogenous interactions
We introduce social networks by assuming that individuals are exogenously forced to interact
with people outside of their own local community. We assume that a newborn will spend a
fraction ω of his time with weak ties and a fraction 1 − ω of his time with his strong tie7.
In this framework, ω captures the intensity of social interactions of each individual which
we interpret as his social network, since it indicates how often an individual meets people
outside his dyad.
7Observe that strong ties and weak ties are assumed to be substitutes, i.e. the more someone spends time
with weak ties, the less he has time to spend with his strong tie.
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We consider ω to be set exogenously in this section and interpret it as a public policy of
social integration or social mixing since by increasing ω, one raises the chance that educated
and uneducated individuals meet. Such policies, like the Moving to Opportunity (MTO)
programs (Katz et al., 2001), have been implemented in the United States. By giving
housing assistance to low-income families, the MTO programs help them relocate to better
and richer neighborhoods. The results of most MTO programs (in particular for Baltimore,
Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles and New York) show a clear improvement of the well-being of
participants and better labor market outcomes (see, in particular, Ladd and Ludwig, 2001,
Katz et al., 2001, Rosenbaum and Harris, 2001). We will endogeneize ω in Section 5 below.
The timing is the same as in the previous section, except that a newborn will only spend
a fraction 1− ω of his time in his dyad and a fraction ω with a weak tie, who is chosen at
random in the rest of the population.8
4.1 Model
The utility of an individual i whose strong tie is uneducated is now given by:
Ui0 (λi) = λiei0 − 1
2
e2i0 − ω (1− η1)αei0 − (1− ω)αei0
where η1 is the time spent with educated weak ties in steady state. Individual i, who has an
uneducated strong tie, can either meet an uneducated weak tie (with probability ω (1− η1))
and, as in the previous section, bears a penalty of α per unit of effort or, with probability
ωη1, this individual can meet an educated weak tie and does not suffer any negative peer
effect. We can write Ui0 (λi) as:
Ui0 (λi) = λiei0 − 1
2
e2i0 − (1− ωη1)αei0
8Note that because of this randomness, the utility which follows should be considered as an expected
utility. However, we can interpret the model as follows: instead of meeting someone at random who will
be educated or not, the newborn meets everyone and splits the fraction ω of his time between everyone. In
that case we do not deal with expected utility, therefore we have chosen not to write the problem in terms
of expected utilities. However in what follows, we sometimes interpret some terms as probabilities instead
of as fractions of time, for simplicity.
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Similarly, the utility of an individual i who has an educated strong tie is given by:
Ui1 (λi) = λiei1 − 1
2
e2i1 − ω (1− η1)αei1
The first-order conditions give:
ei0 = max {0, λi − (1− ωη1)α} (10)
ei1 = max {0, λi − (1− η1)ωα} (11)
Plugging back eij in the utility function and accounting for the outside option U yields:
Ui0 (λi) = max
{
U,
[λi − (1− ωη1)α]2
2
}
(12)
Ui1 (λi) = max
{
U,
[λi − (1− η1)ωα]2
2
}
(13)
As in the previous section, we can determine the threshold values λ˜0 and λ˜1 as follows:
λ˜0 =
√
2U + (1− ωη1)α (14)
λ˜1 =
√
2U + (1− η1)ωα (15)
The probability p0 that an individual with an uneducated strong tie will get educated
and the probability p1 that an individual with an educated strong tie will get educated are
given by:9
p0 = 1− λ˜0 = 1−
√
2U − (1− ωη1)α (16)
p1 = 1− λ˜1 = 1−
√
2U − (1− η1)ωα (17)
In order to close the model, we determine the value of η1 as follows:
η1 = η1 {(1− ω)p1 + ω [η1p1 + (1− η1)p0]}
+(1− η1) {(1− ω)p0 + ω [η1p1 + (1− η1)p0]}
9Below we make sure that these probabilities are between 0 and 1.
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Indeed, in equilibrium, a newborn gets educated if either (i) he meets an educated strong tie
(probability η1), spends a fraction 1− ω of his time with this strong tie and gets educated
(probability p1) and spends a fraction ω of his time with a weak tie who can be either
educated and the newborn gets educated (probability η1p1) or who can be uneducated and
the newborn gets educated (probability (1 − η1)p0) or (ii) meets an uneducated strong tie
(probability 1−η1), spends a fraction 1−ω of his time with this strong tie and gets educated
with probability p0 and spend a fraction ω of his time with a weak tie who can be either
educated and the newborn gets educated (probability η1p1) or who can be uneducated and
the newborn gets educated (probability (1− η1)p0).
This expression can be simplified and we easily obtain:
η1 =
p0
1 + p0 − p1 (18)
By replacing p0 and p1 by their values in (16) and (17), and solving in η1, we obtain:
η1 =
1− α−
√
2U
1− α (19)
and 0 ≤ η1 ≤ 1 if
0 ≤
√
2U ≤ 1− α (20)
which also implies that both p0 and p1 are between 0 and 1.
Looking at (18) and (19), it is easily verified that the individual probability of being
employed, η1, is increasing in both p0 and p1 and decreasing in α. Furthermore, p0 is in-
creasing in the time spent with weak ties, ω, while p1 is decreasing with ω. Finally, η1, p0
and p1 are all decreasing in U . These results are easy to interpret. Take for instance U .
When the outside option increases, a higher share of individuals will prefer not investing in
efforts and the fraction of educated η1 will decrease. The same happens when the penalty
α increases, because the educational effort of individuals decreases (the productivity of edu-
cation decreases) and hence the utility level is reduced and a larger share of the population
will be below U , decreasing the share of educated individuals. Finally, when ω increases,
each individual spends more time with weak ties. If his strong tie is uneducated, then his
probability of being educated p0 increases because he has more chances to meet an educated
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weak tie. If his strong tie is educated, he spends less time with his strong tie who is educated
and bears the risk of paying a cost α if matched with an uneducated weak tie.
4.2 Steady-state equilibrium and intergenerational correlation
We are now able to determine the intergenerational correlation. We have:
Proposition 2 Assume (20). When dyads interact with each other, the parent-child corre-
lation is equal to:
Corexo = (1− ω)4α2 (21)
When α increases, which means that the penalty of meeting someone who is uneducated
increases, the correlation increases because the influence of strong ties is higher. And as seen
in the previous section, this induces an increase in correlation which takes a quadratic form.
On the contrary, when ω increases, the correlation is naturally reduced because individ-
uals are more influenced by their weak ties than their strong ties (i.e. the father’s influence).
This is an interesting result, especially from a policy viewpoint. If the planner wants to
encourage social mobility (Piketty, 1995), he can either decrease α or, more simply and more
efficiently, increase ω. This will increase the interaction between low- and high-educated
families, which can help the former increase the educational level of their children (peer
effects). As a result, any policy promoting “social” integration or “social” mixing (meaning
here that low-educated individuals meet more educated families) would also have positive
effects on these children’s educational achievement. This model can therefore partly explain
the success of the MTO programs, explained earlier. Another illustration of this type of
policy (social mixing) is to have school reforms such as the ones implemented in different
countries, which aim was to prolong schooling at the lower secondary level. Indeed, such a
reform can be interpreted as an early investment in human capital that is complementary
to later skills that are acquired (Cunha et al., 2007). If this investment has a stronger effect
on pupils with a disadvantaged background, we will expect that it may lead to a higher
probability of completion of high school and university, and thus make completion of these
degrees less dependent on family background. One may also expect that staying longer in
school will lead to a change in preferences for the value of schooling and in time preferences,
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leading to more investment in human capital, especially for children with less educated par-
ents. Several recent papers have analyzed the impact of these comprehensive school reforms,
particularly in Europe and Scandinavia, on aspects related to the persistence of education
across generations. Meghir and Palme (2005) and Aakvik et al. (2010) analyze the effect on
earnings and educational attainment of the comprehensive school reforms that took place
in Sweden in the 1950s and Norway in the 1960s, respectively, where mandatory schooling
was extended by two years and all students had to attend the same track. The reforms used
in the studies were implemented as a natural experiment, with the new mandatory schools
being adopted at different times in different municipalities. Both studies find support for
a weakening of the effect of family background for disadvantaged pupils with parents with
low educational attainment. Pekkarinen et al. (2009) more directly assess the effect on the
persistence in income across generations using a similar reform in Finland in the 1970s, but
the focus of this reform was more explicitly on reduced tracking. They find support for a sig-
nificant decrease in the intergenerational income elasticity (for fathers and sons) in Finland
from about 0.29 to about 0.23. This is a quite strong effect, given that the standard result
is that intergenerational income elasticity in the U.S. and U.K. is about 0.40 and about 0.20
in other Nordic countries and Canada (Björklund and Jäntti, 2009). In our model, if the
planner wants to increase social mobility and thus to reduce the role of family background
on children’s educational outcomes, then prolonging schooling is a way to make children
from different backgrounds to interact with each other and to increase the chance for the
disadvantaged students to be educated. In our model, the planner can perform such a policy
by decreasing the intergenerational correlation between parents and children. This will be
analyzed in the next section.
Observe that, in our model, children inherit from their parents a local community with a
certain education status. If we fix α, then increasing ω from 0.1 to 0.5 reduces the correlation
Corexo by more than 90 percent and thus increase social mobility. Of course, while individuals
with uneducated strong ties are favored by such policies, those with educated strong ties are
reluctant to go outside their dyad and take the risk of meeting uneducated weak ties. This
is related to the standard policy debate on desegregation (Guryan, 2004; Rivkin and Welch,
2006) where mixing students of different backgrounds favors the less educated ones but have
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a negative effect on the more educated students.10
4.3 Welfare analysis
As stated above, an increase in ω has a positive effect on low-educated individuals but can
be harmful for high-educated individuals. Because of this trade-off, we would like now to
study the welfare consequences of this issue. The total welfare is given by:
W =
∫ λ˜1
0
Udλ+
∫ λ˜0
λ˜1
(1− η1)Udλ +
∫ 1
λ˜1
η1Ui1 (λ) dλ+
∫ 1
λ˜0
(1− η1)Ui0 (λ) dλ (22)
The social planner can have two objectives. First, he might want to maximize the sum of
utilities (22) of all agents. Second, he might want to minimize the intergenerational corre-
lation in educational status between the father and the son. Minimizing this correlation is
equivalent to reducing the impact of family background (measured here by the “neighbor-
hood quality or peers” that the child inherits from his parent) on the child’s educational
attainment, a policy that has been adopted by most democratic societies (Björklund and
Salvanes, 2011). However, these two objectives are contradictory:
Proposition 3
(i) If the objective of the planner is to maximize total welfare (22), then it is optimal to
set the time spent with weak ties to ωo = 0.
(ii) If the objective is to minimize the intergenerational correlation, i.e. to favor social
mobility, then it is optimal to set the time spent with weak ties to ωo = 1.
This proposition shows that, depending on the objective function, the outcome may be
very different. Indeed, if the planner maximizes the sum of all utilities, then because both
educated and uneducated families matter, he will impose that individuals only stay with their
strong ties, i.e. ωo = 0. This implies that the correlation in employment status between the
father and the son will be equal to α2. This is because it is always costly for sons whose
10See Sáez-Martí and Zenou (2012) who obtain a similar result using a model of cultural trasmission and
statistical discrimination.
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strong ties are educated to meet weak ties since, if they meet an educated weak tie, the
benefit is zero while, if they meet an uneducated one, the cost is αei1. This is, however, less
true for sons who have an uneducated strong tie since if they don’t meet weak ties, they will
always pay a cost of αei1 while, if they meet weak ties, there is a probability ωη1 that they
will pay no cost by meeting an educated weak tie. Since the latter effect is weaker than the
former (because both utilities are quadratic in efforts, which implies that the loss of utility
of a person with an educated strong tie meeting weak ties is not sufficiently compensated by
the gain of utility of a person with an uneducated strong tie meeting educated weak ties),
the planner finds it optimal to set ωo = 0. On the contrary, when the objective is to promote
social mobility by minimizing the intergenerational correlation in educational status between
the father and the son, then this trade off does not exist anymore and therefore the planner
sets ωo = 1 so that the correlation is equal to zero, which means that a son who inherits an
educated strong tie and the one who inherits an uneducated strong tie have the same chance
of becoming educated.
Remark 1 Both the aggregate welfare and the correlation are decreasing and convex. Thus
increasing ω decreases both the correlation and the welfare very fast.
5 The role of social networks
We will now endogeneize ω so that individuals choose both educational effort and the time
spent with their strong (or weak) tie. The timing is now as follows. At each period of time,
a person (the father) dies at a random rate and is replaced by a newborn (the son) who
takes his place in the dyad. The son then discovers the type of his strong tie (educated or
not educated) as well as his λi. He then optimally decides ωij, the time spent with weak and
strong ties and then eij the optimal education effort level.
5.1 Model
Individual ij (i.e. individual who is of type λi and who has a strong tie j = 0, 1) first decides
ωij and then chooses eij. The utility of each individual ij who puts efforts ωij and eij is now
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given by:11
Ui0 (λi) = λiei0 − 1
2
e2i0 − (1− ωi0η1)αei0
Ui1 (λi) = λiei1 − 1
2
e2i1 − ωi1 (1− η1)αei1
These utility functions are exactly the same as in the previous section. As usual, we solve
the model backward. First-order conditions on efforts yield:
e∗i0 = max {0, λi − (1− ωi0η1)α}
e∗i1 = max {0, λi − (1− η1)ωi1α}
which imply:
U∗i0 (λi) =
1
2
(e∗i0)
2 = max
{
U,
[λi − (1− ωi0η1)α]2
2
}
(23)
U∗i1 (λi) =
1
2
(e∗i1)
2 = max
{
U,
[λi − ωi1 (1− η1)α]2
2
}
(24)
Let us now solve the first stage for ωij. Since both (1− ωi0η1) > 0 and ωi1(1 − η1) > 0, it
should be clear that:
ω∗i0 = 1 and ω
∗
i1 = 0 (25)
This is quite intuitive. Individuals who inherited an uneducated strong tie from their father
always want to meet weak ties because this gives the possibility of meeting an educated
person and avoid the penalty α. On the other hand, those whose strong ties are educated
never want to meet weak ties because of the risk of the penalty α.
What is interesting here is to compare the result when individuals choose how much time
they spend with their weak (or strong) ties (see (25)) and the one when it is the planner who
makes this choice (Proposition 3). We have seen that the planner will choose ω∗i0 = ω
∗
i1 = 0
if it maximizes the sum of all utilities while it will choose ω∗i0 = ω
∗
i1 = 1 if it wants to increase
11Observe that we do not introduce a cost of socialization, −1
2
ω2, because we want to stay in line with
the model of the previous section. We also believe that educational costs are much higher than socialization
costs so that the latter can be ignored. Moreover it sets aside the problems of multiplicity of equilibria,
which are not the focus of this paper
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social mobility (or equivalently reduces the intergenerational correlation). This result is in
sharp contrast with (25) where individuals with uneducated strong ties decide to spend all
their time with weak ties, i.e., ω∗i0 = 1 while individuals with educated strong ties prefer
to spend all their time with strong ties, i.e. ω∗i1 = 0. This is due to the fact that the
planner internalizes the externalities generated by these choices while individuals don’t. For
individuals with uneducated strong ties, it is always beneficial to meet weak ties in order to
avoid to pay the penalty α while, the planner will make such a choice only if it wants to
increase social mobility.
Using (25), we easily obtain:
λ˜0 =
√
2U + (1− η1)α and λ˜1 =
√
2U (26)
Furthermore,
p0 = 1−
√
2U − (1− η1)α and p1 = 1−
√
2U (27)
and
Ui0 (λi) = max
{
U,
[λi − (1− η1)α]2
2
}
Ui1 (λi) = max
{
U,
λ2i
2
}
Let us compute the value of η1. Again, individuals whose ability exceeds λ˜0 will get educated
whatever the status of their strong tie. They represent a mass of size p0. Those whose ability
is lower than λ˜1 will never get educated while those such that λ˜0 > λi > λ˜1 will get educated
only if they meet an educated (strong or weak) tie. There is a mass p1−p0 of these individuals.
As a result,
η1 = p0 + (p1 − p0)[η1 + (1− η1)η1]
Indeed, in order to meet an educated (strong or weak) tie, either the strong tie is educated
(with probability η1 and, in that case, the newborn i always stays with him as he will choose
ωi1 = 0) or the strong tie is uneducated (with probability 1 − η1) and then the newborn
i chooses ωi0 = 1 so that he needs to meet an educated weak tie (with probability η1).
Rearranging these terms, we obtain:
η1 = p0 + (p1 − p0)[η1(2− η1)]
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Using the fact that p1 − p0 = (1− η1)α, we get η1 as a solution of:
F (η1) ≡ αη31 − 3αη21 + (3α− 1)η1 + 1−
√
2U − α = 0 (28)
This is equivalent to:
F (η1) ≡ α (η1 − 1)3 − η1 + 1−
√
2U = 0 (29)
We have the following lemma which guarantees the existence of a unique equilibrium and
gives some comparative-statics results.
Lemma 1 If
√
2U < 1− α, there exists a unique solution η∗1 ∈ [0, 1] to (29). Furthermore,
∂η∗1
∂U
< 0 and
∂η∗1
∂α
< 0
5.2 Steady-state equilibrium and intergenerational correlation
When the socialization decisions are endogenous, there is still a positiveintergenerational
correlation.
Proposition 4 If
√
2U < 1 − α, there exists a unique equilibrium for which ω∗i0 = 1,
ω∗i1 = 0 and η1 is given by the solution to (29). In that equilibrium, the correlation between
the educational status of the father and the son is equal to:
Cornet =
(
p1 − η1
1− η1
)2
=
(
1−
√
2U − η1
1− η1
)2
(30)
In the model without interactions (Section 3) or in the model with exogenous level of
interactions (Section 4), the correlation could be expressed as a function of the quantity12
(p1 − p0), which can be written as (p1 − η1) + [(1− p0)− (1− η1)]. The first term measures
the bias in the probability of getting educated induced by the chance of having an educated
strong tie. Said differently, it is the difference between the conditional probability and the
overall probability of getting educated. Similarly, the second term measures how much
having an uneducated strong tie impacts on the probability of not getting educated.
12In Proposition 2 the correlation can be written as (1− ω)2(p1 − p0)2.
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In Proposition 4, the correlation can be explained as follows. When a newborn meets
an educated strong tie, his extra chance of being educated can again be written as p1 − η1.
This should be normalized by the probability of meeting an uneducated individual in the
population, 1 − η1. Now the other term disappears because when meeting an uneducated
strong tie, newborns spend all their time with weak ties and thus incur no bias vis à vis the
average. The quadratic form appears for the same reasons as before.
Remark 2 Contrary to the previous sections, the correlation Cornet (positively) depends on
U . This is due to the fact that a change in U affects both p0 and p1. In Sections 3 and 4
both probabilities were affected in the same way and cancelled out in the quantity p1 − p0.
Here, it is no longer the case because of the asymmetry in behavior of individuals, depending
on the status of their strong tie.
We would now like to compare the results between the different models and to highlight
the role of social interactions and networks on the intergenerational correlation and the
equilibrium share of educated individuals.
Proposition 5 The correlation in education status between father and son is always lower
when there are social interactions than when there are not, i.e. Cornet < Cordyad. More-
over, the equilibrium share of educated individuals is always higher when there are social
interactions than when there are not, i.e. η1,net > η1,dyad.
This proposition shows that the network reduces the correlation and increases the average
education level in the population. As a result, taking into account weak ties in the network
changes dramatically both the share of educated individuals and the intergenerational cor-
relation between the father and the son.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed an overlapping generations model where, at each period of time,
with some probability, a person (the parent) dies and is replaced by a new born (the child).
The new born takes exactly the same position as the father in the dyad and thus interacts
23
with the same person (strong tie), i.e. the local community of his father. There is therefore
no vertical transmission but only horizontal transmission via peer and neighborhood effects.
We assume that meeting an uneducated individual (strong or weak tie) has a cost when
providing educational effort. This cost captures the idea of negative peer effects, i.e. the
fact that uneducated role models can distract individuals from educating themselves by, for
example, proposing activities that are not related to education (watching TV, going to the
movies, etc.). On the contrary, there is no cost of interacting with educated peers.
We first show that, even though the parent and his child never live together at the same
time (and thus never interact with each other), there is always a positive correlation between
their educational status because there is a substantial overlap in the surroundings that have
influenced their education decisions. We then study the role of networks on the correlation in
parent-child educational status independent of any parent-child interaction. Here networks
are captured by weak and strong ties and the individual has to decide how much time he
wants to spend with each type of ties. We show that the network reduces the intergen-
erational correlation, promotes social mobility and increases the average education level in
the population. We also show that a planner that maximizes social welfare does not want
individuals with a good and bad educational environment to interact with each other. We
also show that if the planner’s aim is to reduce the intergenerational correlation in education
status between the parent and the child (or equivalently promote social mobility), he prefers
that plenty of interactions take place between these two groups. When the individuals make
these choices themselves, those with uneducated strong ties always want to meet weak ties
while the reverse occurs for individuals with educated strong ties.
We believe that this paper sheds some light on the effect of the inherited neighborhood
and peers on children’s education outcomes. It is indeed difficult to empirically distinguish
between direct parental and social influences on education. But only focussing on the lat-
ter and providing a mechanism by which this effect takes place, our model provides some
predictions that allow one to distinguish social effects from direct effects.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: Since η1 is determined by (8), we need to derive the joint
probability η11
η11 = p1µ11 +
1
2
p0µ01 +
1
2
p0µ10
Observe first that
µ11 = p1η1
Indeed, for a dyad to be in state 11 (an individual and his strong tie are both educated), it
has to be that a newborn is born in a dyad with an educated strong tie (with probability
η1) and gets educated (with probability p1). Using a similar argument, we also have:
µ10 = µ01 =
1
2
(1− p1)η1 +
1
2
p0(1− η1) = (1− p1)η1
and
µ00 = (1− p0)(1− η1)
From these three expressions, we obtain:
η11 = p1µ11 + p0µ01
= η1
[
p21 + p0(1− p1)
]
Finally, we have:
Cor(X,Y )
dyad
=
η11 − η21
η1(1− η1)
=
p21 + p0(1− p1)− η1
1− η1
which, after some manipulations, leads to (9).
Proof of Proposition 2: From equation (19), we have:
η1 =
1− α−
√
2U
1− α− ωδ =
p0
1 + p0 − p1
Now, the joint probability to have both a newborn and his father educated, η11, is given by
η11 = (1− ω)(µ11p1 + µ10p0) + ω(µ11 + µ10)[η1p1 + (1− η1)p0]
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Indeed, in order to have both a newborn and his father in state 1, there are two possibilities:
(i) either the son interacts within his dyad (probability (1−ω)). In that case, the father
has to be in state 1, which is the case with probability 1 if it is a 11 dyad (µ11) and with
probability 1/2 if it is a 10 or 01 dyad (µ10 or µ01). The son will get educated with probability
p1 if the father was in the dyad 11 and with probability p0 if the father was in a dyad 10 or
01.
(ii) or the son interacts with a weak tie (with probability ω). In that case, the father has
to be educated (with probability µ11+ µ10) and then the son gets educated with probability
p1 if he meets an educated individual (with probability η1) and with probability p0 if he
meets an uneducated individual (with probability (1− η1)).
In this framework, µ11 is given by
µ11 = η1[(1− ω)p1 + ω(η1p1 + (1− η1)p0)]
and µ10 is given by
µ10 =
1
2
(1− η1) {(1− ω)p0 + ω [η1p1 + (1− η1)p0]}
+
1
2
η1 {(1− ω)(1− p1) + ω [η1(1− p1) + (1− η1)(1− p0)]}
Indeed, for a 10 dyad to form, either an individual meets a type−0 individual (with proba-
bility (1− η1)) and gets educated (either by staying within the dyad ((1− ω)p0) or outside
the dyad (ω(η1p1+(1−η1)p0)), or an individual meets a type−1 individual (with probability
η1) and decides not to educate (either by staying within the dyad ((1−ω)(1−p1)) or outside
the dyad (ω(η1(1− p1) + (1− η1)(1− p0))).
Observing that η1p1+(1− η1)p0 = η1, that η1(1− p1) = (1− η1)p0 and that η1(1− p1)+
(1− η1)(1− p0) = 1− η1, we have:
µ11 = η1[(1− ω)p1 + ωη1]
µ10 =
1
2
(1− η1)[(1− ω)p0 + ωη1] +
1
2
η1[(1− ω)(1− p1) + ω(1− η1)]
µ10 =
1
2
(1− η1)(2ωη1) +
1
2
(1− ω)[η1(1− p1) + (1− η1)p0]
µ10 = ω(1− η1)η1 + (1− ω)η1(1− p1)
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Furthermore, we have:
µ11p1 + µ10p0 = η1[(1− ω)(p21 + p0(1− p1)) + ω(p1η1 + p0(1− η1))]
µ11p1 + µ10p0 = η1[(1− ω)(p21 + p0(1− p1)) + ωη1]
This implies that
η11 = (1− ω)2η1(p21 + p0(1− p1)) + ω(1− ω)η21 + ωη21
and
η11 − η21
η1
= (1− ω)2 [p21 + p0(1− p1)]+ (2ω − ω2 − 1)η1
= (1− ω)2 [p21 + p0(1− p1)− η1]
Finally
Corexo =
η11 − η21
η1(1− η1)
= (1− ω)2p
2
1 + p0(1− p1)− η1
1− η1
= (1− ω)2(p1 − p0)2
= (1− ω)4α2
which is (21).
Proof of Proposition 3: Let us first analyze (i). The total welfare is given by (22),
which is
W =
∫ λ˜1
0
Udλ+
∫ λ˜0
λ˜1
(1− η1)Udλ+
∫ 1
λ˜1
η1Ui1 (λ) dλ+
∫ 1
λ˜0
(1− η1)Ui0 (λ) dλ
The first two terms can be calculated and it is easily shown that:∫ λ˜1
0
Udλ+
∫ λ˜0
λ˜1
(1− η1)Udλ = λ˜0U − η1U
(
λ˜0 − λ˜1
)
which using (14) and (15) gives
K ≡
∫ λ˜1
0
Udλ+
∫ λ˜0
λ˜1
(1− η1)Udλ = U
[√
2U + (1− η1)α
]
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which is independent of ω (see (19)) and thus we can ignore these first two terms. So the
planner maximizes ∫ 1
λ˜1
η1Ui1 (λ) dλ+
∫ 1
λ˜0
(1− η1)Ui0 (λ) dλ
Using (12) and (13), we have:∫ 1
λ˜1
η1Ui1 (λ) dλ+
∫ 1
λ˜0
(1− η1)Ui0 (λ) dλ
=
1
6
{
η1
[
(λi − ωα+ ωη1α)3
]1
λ˜1
+ (1− η1)
[
(λi − α+ ωη1α)3
]1
λ˜0
}
Using (14) and (15), we see that
λ˜1 − ωα+ ωη1α =
√
2U = λ˜0 − α+ ωη1α
As a result, we obtain:
W = K − 1
6
(√
2U
)3
+
1
6
[
η1 (1− ωα+ ωη1α)3 + (1− η1) (1− α+ ωη1α)3
]
= K ′ +
1
6
[η1(1− ωα+ ωη1α)3 + (1− η1)(1− α+ ωη1α)3]
We are looking for a ω∗ such that ∂W
∂ω
= 0. We have:
∂W
∂ω
=
η1α(η1 − 1)
2
[(1− ωα+ ωη1α)2 − (1− α+ ωη1α)2]
There are two solutions to ∂W
∂ω
= 0, which are either
ω∗ = 1
or
ω∗ =
2− α
α(1− 2η1)
Since the latter is either strictly greater than 1 or negative, the unique solution is ω∗ = 1.
Let us now analyze (ii). The correlation is given by (21), that is
Corexo = (1− ω)2(p1 − p0)2 = (1− ω)4α2
Since ∂Corexo
∂ω
< 0, it is should be clear that the solution to this program is ω∗ = 0.
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Proof of Remark 1:
∂2W
∂ω2
=
η1α
2(η1 − 1)
2
[−1 + η1α− 2ωη1α+ ωα]
which has a constant sign over [0, 1] , and
∂2W
∂ω2
|ω=0 > 0
Proof of Lemma 1: Assume √
2U < 1− α (31)
and we have (see (29))
F (η1) ≡ α (η1 − 1)3 +
(
1−
√
2U − η1
)
Since limη1→−∞ F (η1) = −∞ and limη1→+∞ F (η1) = +∞ and since F (0) = 1−
√
2U−α > 0
(which is (31)) and F (1) = −
√
2U < 0, then the cubic equation F (η1) has necessarily a
unique solution η∗1 ∈ [0, 1].
Let us now totally differentiate (29). Observe that ∂F (η1)/∂η1 < 0 since it is the slope
of (29) (the cubic equation in η1) taken at the point η
∗
1, where the polynomial goes from
positive to negative values. Thus,
sign
∂η∗1
∂x
= sign
∂F (η1)
∂x
where x = α,U . We easily obtain:
∂F (η1)
∂α
= (η1 − 1)3 < 0
∂F (η1)
∂U
= − 1√
2U
< 0
Proof of Proposition 4: Let us calculate the correlation between the father and son.
This correlation is given by:
Cornet =
η11 − η21
η1(1− η1)
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We have
η1 = η1p1 + (1− η1)[η1p1 + (1− η1)p0]
from which we derive
η1p1 + (1− η1)p0 =
η1(1− p1)
(1− η1)
(32)
The steady-state distributions are given by
µ11 = η1p1
µ10 =
1
2
η1(1− p1) +
1
2
(1− η1) [η1p1 + (1− η1)p0]
Indeed, for a µ11 dyad to be formed, it must be that a newborn meets an educated strong
tie (probability η1) and that he gets educated. But since ω
∗
i1 = 0 in equilibrium, he only
interacts with his strong tie and gets educated with probability p1.
Accordingly, for a µ10 (or a µ01) dyad to be formed, it must be that either a newborn meets
an educated strong tie (he then sets ωi1 = 0) and does not get educated, with probability
(1 − p1) or the newborn meets a non educated strong tie (probability 1 − η1, he then sets
ωi0 = 1) and needs to get educated whatever the status of the weak tie (η1p1 if he meets an
educated weak tie or (1−η1)p0 if he meets a non educated weak tie). Rearranging and using
(32), we obtain:
µ11 = η1p1
µ10 = η1(1− p1)
In turn η11 is given by
η11 = µ11p1 + µ10 [η1p1 + (1− η1)p0]
Indeed, for the father and the son to be both educated, it must be the case that the father
was educated and that the son gets educated. Either the father was part of a µ11 dyad and
then the son meets an educated strong tie, in which case he gets educated with probability
p1, or the father was in a µ10 dyad and then the son meets an uneducated strong tie, in which
case he only interacts with weak ties and gets educated with probability η1p1 + (1− η1)p0.
Replacing for µ11 and µ10, we get
η11 = η1p
2
1 + η1(1− p1) [η1p1 + (1− η1)p0]
= η1
[
p21 + (1− p1)2
(
η1
1− η1
)]
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Hence
η11 − η21
η1
= p21 + (1− p1)2
η1
1− η1
− η1
=
p21 − 2η1p1 + η21
1− η1
=
(p1 − η1)2
1− η1
and finally
Cor =
(
p1 − η1
1− η1
)2
which is (30).
Proof of Remark 2: Differentiating Cornet gives
∂Cornet
∂U
= −2
(
p∗1 − η∗1
1− η∗1
) ∂η∗1
∂U
(1− p∗1) + (
1−η∗
1)√
2U
(1− η∗1)2
But 1− p∗1 =
√
2U and
∂η∗1
∂U
= −∂F (η1)/∂U
F ′(η1)
so
Sgn
(
∂Cornet
∂U
)
= Sgn
(
2U
∂F (η1)/∂U
F ′(η1)
+ (1− η∗1)
)
Thus,
∂Cornet
∂U
> 0⇐⇒
√
2U > (η1 − 1)F ′(η1)
Using (29) one can write√
2U = αη31 − 3αη21 + (3α− 1)η1 + 1− α
= (η1 − 1)[αη21 − 2αη1 + α− 1]
and check that the above inequality is always true.
Proof of Proposition 5: Let us first show that Cornet < Cordyad. This amounts to
show that
Cornet =
(
p1 − η1
1− η1
)2
< α2
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This is equivalent to:
p1 − η1
1− η1
< α⇔ p1 − α
1− α < η1
Because η1 is the solution of F (η1) = 0 (see 29)), then
p1 − α
1− α < η1
is equivalent to F
(
p1−α
1−α
)
> 0 because p1−α
1−α
> 0. We have:
F
(
p1 − α
1− α
)
=
(p1 − α)
(1− α)3
[
α(p1 − α)2 − 3α(1− α)(p1 − α) + (3α− 1)(1− α)2 + (1− α)3
]
Thus
sgn
{
F
(
p1 − α
1− α
)}
= sgn
{
p21 + p1(α− 3)− α+ 2
}
But the term in brackets is always positive when p1 ≤ 1. Hence F
(
p1−α
1−α
)
> 0 and therefore
Cornet =
(
p1 − η1
1− η1
)2
< α2
Let us now show that η1,net > η1,dyad. Notice that the equilibrium share of educated
individuals in Section 3 is given by
η1 =
1−
√
2U − α
1− α =
p1 − α
1− α
As we have just shown, F (p1−α
1−α
) > 0 and therefore η1,net > η1,dyad.
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